

P-48  
13

PS98

INTERVENTION IN CUBA.

Better a bold declaration of war on account of the Maine disaster and other differences with Spain than the entangling resolutions before the Senate. It is the destruction of the Maine, not yet properly explained, that stirs the American people.

I favor making the war swift, decisive, and destructive, taking Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines; then on to Cadiz and Barcelona with our squadrons, and on our banners inscribed "Remember the Maine."

West Virginia University

SPEECH

L. C. White Library

OF

No. P48-13

HON. STEPHEN B. ELKINS,

OF WEST VIRGINIA,

IN THE


UNITED STATES SENATE,

SATURDAY, APRIL 16, 1898.



WASHINGTON,  
1898.







## INTERVENTION IN CUBA.

---

Better a bold declaration of war on account of the Maine disaster and other differences with Spain than the entangling resolutions before the Senate. It is the destruction of the Maine, not yet properly explained, that stirs the American people.

I favor making the war swift, decisive, and destructive, taking Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines; then on to Cadiz and Barcelona with our squadrons, and on our banners inscribed "Remember the Maine."

---

## SPEECH

OF

# HON. STEPHEN B. ELKINS,

OF WEST VIRGINIA,

IN THE


UNITED STATES SENATE,

SATURDAY, APRIL 16, 1898.

---

WASHINGTON.

1898.





SPEECH  
OF  
HON. STEPHEN B. ELKINS.

---

The Senate having under consideration the joint resolution (S. R. 149) for the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the Island of Cuba and to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect—

Mr. ELKINS said:

Mr. PRESIDENT: War seems inevitable, and it is useless to discuss the question further. Closing the debate to-day indicates that the Senate wants war, and wants it now. We are not willing to wait over Sunday to pass these resolutions. Is there fear that peace may be secured on the Island of Cuba before war can be declared? I wish more time had been given to the discussion of this momentous subject. I think we should have had more light on the difficult questions raised; and it would have been better for all concerned. Speeches like those made yesterday on both sides would have been helpful and instructive to Senators and the country.

But I bow to the will of the majority in limiting debate and accept the time allotted to me. I desire to devote this time, as far as I can, mainly to a discussion of the question of the recognition of the independence of the Cuban insurgents. Apart from the minority report favoring the recognition of the Cuban insurgents, I believe the first resolution reported by the majority of the committee, if it means anything, recognizes the independence of the insurgents. The resolution reads:

First. That the people of the Island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

Leaving out the words "and of right ought to be," the resolution would read: "That the people of the Island of Cuba are free



and independent." This is not a fact; it is not true. Now, the next resolution:

It is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish—

If the Cuban Government is independent on the Island of Cuba, it is the only government authorized to act in regard to the war between Cuba and Spain. We might become the ally of the Cuban people; but if Cuba is independent, she is the party authorized to act, and the United States is excluded from making any such demand.

I oppose the recognition of the independence of the insurgents in Cuba for a number of reasons.

First, they have not won their independence as other nations seeking to be admitted into the family of nations have won theirs in their struggle for freedom.

Second, according to their own constitution the government of the insurgents is only temporary and preparatory in its character, and on the conclusion of hostilities must be succeeded by a "democratic republic." This would be the government to recognize when it is established. An extract from the constitution of the government of the insurgents is as follows:

We, the representatives of the Cuban people, freely meeting in constituent assembly, convoked by virtue of the mandate contained in the constitution of the 16th of September, 1895, ratify our firm and unshakable resolve of obtaining the absolute and immediate independence of the island, in order to establish in it a democratic republic, and inspiring ourselves in the present necessities of the revolution; we decree the following, etc.

Third. To recognize the independence of Cuba now would be contrary to international law and the American doctrine on the subject for a hundred years, besides being a dangerous precedent.

We will defeat Spain, and, in my judgment, easily and quickly. We know the result now. She can not fight so far from her base, 3,000 miles away. She has no coal in the Western Hemisphere and can not bring the supply from home to coal her war vessels. Coal is more important to Spain than powder. We can also pay the costs of this war; but, in my opinion, this doctrine of the *recognition of independence before it is established, if adhered to, may cause many wars*, that may cost this nation in the future thousands of millions of dollars and again threaten the destruction of this Republic.



Mr. President, Congress should follow the recommendation of the President in his message, but refusing to do so, it should not embarrass him by sending him a resolution for his approval declaring that Cuba is free and independent when he explicitly declares in his message that it is not, and makes an argument to show this fact and that its independence should not be recognized. Mr. Quesada, the chargé d'affaires of the insurgent government, as I understand, stated before a committee of the House that unaided it would take twelve years to establish the independence of Cuba. He is the authorized representative of the insurgent government, and, speaking to a committee of Congress on the subject, his word should be taken as conclusive.

We have also the testimony of Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, who has served as our consul-general at Havana, I think, for two or three years. It is his judgment and his advice, as I understand it, to the United States at this juncture not to recognize the independence of the insurgents. To my mind his advice should have great weight. I confess it has had much to do in forming my judgment outside of the precedents and international law.

The Committee on Foreign Relations, in its report on page 7, says:

Upon due consideration of all the relevant facts of the relations of this Government with Spain, including the destruction of the *Maine*, and of the history of the rebellion, it is the opinion of your committee that the United States ought at once to recognize the independence of the people of Cuba, and also ought to intervene to the end that the war and its unexampled atrocities shall cease, and that such independence shall become a *settled political fact* at the earliest possible moment.

In the face of this finding that independence is not a settled political fact the committee call on us to declare what? That Cuba is free and independent; to declare in the face of the world a fact which is not true. How can we possibly do this? We want to follow the Committee on Foreign Relations. We want to stand by it. We want to stand by the President also, who says it is not a fact, and he is the authorized power under the Constitution to determine the question. We should be united in this matter, but how can we be? The Congress of the United States is asked by one of its great committees to declare solemnly something to be true that all agree is not true, and that the insurgents themselves say is not true. How will such a transaction appear



to the world? What answer can we make to such inconsistency? There is no foundation for this declaration. We admit there is none. The world knows it. If Cuba is independent, why does Spain occupy one-half of the territory on the island, all the sea-coast towns and cities, and maintain this occupation by an army? Why do not other nations near by, almost as near as we are, recognize the independence of Cuba? Why are not Mexico and the South American States agitated over the subject of the independence of Cuba? If the Cuban insurgents are independent, why should not they, as the only authorized power in Cuba, have made the demand on Spain, to withdraw her land or naval forces? Now, as to the demand by the United States, besides ignoring the President, it is not proper in form, is unnecessarily harsh and abrupt. Who is to execute this demand but the President? If such a demand had been left to the Executive, as it should have been, I am sure he would have expressed it in better form.

If the second resolution is to pass, it ought to be amended so as to authorize the President to speak to Spain for the Government, as he always does to foreign nations. There has never been any departure from this course. Congress has never spoken to foreign governments. It never can. It has no one to make the communication. The communication must be made by the Executive, the only proper authority.

It seems to me that the second resolution ignores the President. The third resolution of course could not ignore him. It had to take him into account, because he is by the Constitution of the United States the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy and must lead our forces in war, and execute any direction or order of Congress. In recognizing independence Congress usurps power belonging exclusively to the President. This is his function and can not be taken from him by Congress. Violating the Constitution by taking power from the Executive is worse and more dangerous than war. The report of the committee, so far as I have been able to read and understand it, seems to me illogical and contradictory, with some good authorities cited to support the position taken; but on the whole the resolutions do not follow the report.

Mr. President, up to this hour, although the war in Cuba has been waged three years, there has been no great battle fought,



no conflict with the insurgents that has risen to the dignity of a battle. As I learn, not 200 men have been killed on either side in any engagement. In all struggles by people for independence there have been great battles fought on the part of the insurgents before recognition has been considered. This is true in cases where independence has been brought about by revolt and war and not by the great powers, as in the case of Belgium and Greece.

According to the distinguished Senators who have visited the island and made reports, and especially the Senator from Vermont [Mr. PROCTOR], who has stirred this nation in a great speech as no other man has done here, there are on the Island of Cuba 60,000 Spanish and 30,000 insurgent soldiers. Now he asks us, according to his own testimony, to believe, while there are two Spanish soldiers to one insurgent soldier, and Spain in possession of all the seacoast towns and cities, that Cuba is free and independent; that this independence should be recognized, and we should go to war to make independence a fact.

But I will say to the Senator that I challenge his statement, if other reputable men, not so distinguished as he, can be believed. I do not think it is possible for the Senator or for other Senators to go through a foreign country, not speaking the language, when there is a state of rebellion and war and gather information sufficiently accurate to guide the Senate and the country to the extent of going to war.

Mr. PROCTOR. Will the Senator allow me?

Mr. ELKINS. Certainly.

Mr. PROCTOR. Will he take the evidence of our representatives there—our consuls? It agrees fully in regard to the respective numbers with my statement.

Mr. ELKINS. I would take that ordinarily. I would rather, however, take the statement of the Senator from Vermont a thousand times if I could; but, sir, there is a man from Boston, a reputable gentleman, who has lived on the island for nearly thirty years and who has a half a million dollars invested there, who tells the country the true state of affairs there. He says according to best information there are only five or six thousand insurgents in arms, and that 15,000 is the extreme number that can be assembled.

None of the Senators who went there spoke the language, as I



am informed; and I submit, on so short a stay, they could have been imposed upon in many cases by insurgent sympathizers. It is impossible to learn the true conditions of a country in a state of war in so short a time. I credit these Senators with sincerity, and know and feel that they are incapable of intentionally misleading anybody on any subject. They are high-minded and honorable men.

Mr. Atkins—and I state his name—says that Cubitas, where the Cuban capital and the secretaries of state, for war, navy, and the treasury are located, as stated by the Senator from Ohio [Mr. FORAKER], where they hold congress and where the government is located, is a deserted sugar mill. But this is not important if there is a government. I am not disputing these facts for the purpose of belittling the Cuban struggle for freedom, but I am stating them to see whether they and all others when assembled make a case that authorizes recognition. In response to the suggestion made to me by the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. ALLEN], I will say that I think we have \$17,000,000 of claims against the Spanish Government.

Mr. MASON. Has not Mr. Atkins some claim?

Mr. ELKINS. I do not know whether he has or not. Likely he has. No American could live there ten or fifteen years without having claims against the Spanish Government, for there is want of protection to property on the island.

Mr. MASON. Does he not pay for protection?

Mr. ELKINS. He says that he defends his property against the insurgents with his own guard, and he has paid first and last \$90,000 for protection. That is the way to get protection there.

Mr. GALLINGER. Are not Spanish guards protecting his estate?

Mr. ELKINS. Yes, as I understand; helping. I am not defending the Spanish troops, nor am I attacking the insurgents; both are responsible for much of the disorder that goes on in the island. I am trying to get at the truth.

RECOGNITION NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW.

According to international law and precedents on the subject, from the standpoint of success on the part of the insurgents, battles fought, territory occupied, government established, courts



held, jurisdiction exercised, having a capital and congress, the insurgents are not entitled to recognition. Under the American doctrine, always adhered to in our history, there is no warrant for recognizing the independence of Cuba.

In our civil war with the South the Confederates held possession of one-third of the Republic. The Confederate States exercised authority and jurisdiction over this large extent of territory. They had a capital that was known all over the world, a congress that held regular sessions, an organized government that issued money, carried on trade and commerce, had ships, had a navy, and armies commanded by great generals, and fought battles equal to any the world has ever seen. I know something about those armies. They were too much in evidence. They were everywhere in our front; we did not have to look far to find them. There was no dispute about the existence of the Confederate government. Notwithstanding all these facts and a struggle for independence such as no people in history ever made, the United States constantly resisted for four years any intervention or recognition of the Confederacy by Europe. When a Union soldier laid down at night under the stars, worn, and fatigued, his thought was: "Will I wake in the morning to read of the recognition of the Southern Confederacy by Europe?" But it never came, and the Union was saved.

Why depart from this doctrine now? It is the American doctrine, and has been adhered to by our Government for a century. It saved the Union during the civil war. If the doctrine of recognition now demanded had obtained in our civil war we would have had two governments in the United States to-day. The struggle of the Cubans presents no such example and no such claim as the South had for recognition. Take the case of the United States when we won our independence. France was our ally, substantially at war with England. That was one reason why she helped us, and recognized our independence. We desired recognition by the nations of the world, but did not get it until Burgoyne and Cornwallis had surrendered and every British soldier on our soil was a prisoner.

[At this point Mr. ELKINS suspended because of the announcement by the Chair that his time had expired; and unanimous consent was given that he might proceed.]



Mr. ELKINS. Mr. President, in the case of the Republic of Texas, recognition was delayed ten years after it became an independent Republic, and when the United States recognized its independence there was not a Mexican soldier on its soil. Mexico did not get her independence until the Spanish forces were expelled from that territory. The Argentine Republic, or Buenos Ayres, fought and resisted Spanish power twenty-one years, and recognition did not come until fourteen years after the Spaniards had been expelled from that country. See how guarded in all these cases in this hemisphere or on this continent the United States and Europe have been in respect to the recognition of independence, and the admitting of a new state into the family of nations. It is an important transaction, and one in which the whole world has an interest. These are the American precedents that should guide and govern us. Other cases can be cited. Above all, we should heed the doctrine that we so zealously proclaimed and adhered to during our civil war, and have adhered to since we have been a nation.

General Grant, when President, in his message to Congress in December, 1875, stated the case clearly. I had the honor at that time of serving in the House with a number of members who are now Senators on this floor and remember what then transpired. The Cubans had struggled for seven years against Spanish authority on the Island of Cuba. Apart from the death by starvation in the present struggle, the facts are about the same now as in the war that was waged in 1875. General Grant opposed both recognition of independence and belligerency, on the ground that the Cuban insurgents were not entitled to either. He said the struggle did not rise to the dignity of war. His sympathies were with the Cuban insurgents as ours are to-day, and he knew the United States had suffered loss of commerce and trade on the islands; but with all these things before him he could not reach the conclusion that the Cubans were entitled to belligerent rights or had won their independence.

I read the following extracts from President Grant's annual message dated December 7, 1875:

The past year has furnished no evidence of an approaching termination of the ruinous conflict which has been raging for seven years in the neighboring Island of Cuba. The same disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and



of the just demands of humanity which has heretofore called forth expressions of condemnation from the nations of Christendom has continued to blacken the sad scene.

Desolation, ruin, and pillage are pervading the rich fields of one of the most fertile and productive regions of the earth, and the incendiaries' torch, firing plantations and valuable factories and building, is the agent marking the alternate advance or retreat of contending parties.

Our own civil conflict is too recent for us not to consider the difficulties which surround a government distracted by a dynastic rebellion at home at the same time that it has to cope with a separate insurrection in a distant colony. But whatever causes may have produced the situation which so grievously affects our interests, it exists with all its attendant evils operating directly upon this country and its people. Thus far all the efforts of Spain have proved abortive and time has marked no improvement in the situation.

In contests of this nature, where a considerable body of people who have attempted to free themselves of the control of the superior government have reached such point in occupation of territory, in power, and in general organization as to constitute in fact a body politic, having a government in substance as well as in name, possessed of the elements of stability, and equipped with the machinery for the administration of internal policy and the execution of its laws, prepared and able to administer justice at home as well as in its dealings with other powers, it is within the province of those other powers to recognize its existence as a new and independent nation. In such cases other nations simply deal with an actually existing condition of things, and recognizes as one of the powers of the earth that body politic which, possessing the necessary elements, has in fact become a new power. In a word, the creation of a new state is a fact.

To establish the condition of things essential to the recognition of this fact there must be a people occupying a known territory, united under some known and defined form of government, acknowledged by those subject thereto, in which the functions of government are administered by usual methods, competent to mete out justice to citizens and strangers, to afford remedies for public and for private wrongs, and able to assume the correlative international obligations, and capable of performing the corresponding international duties resulting from its acquisition of the rights of sovereignty. A power should exist complete in its organization, ready to take and able to maintain its place among the nations of the earth.

While conscious that the insurrection in Cuba has shown a strength and endurance which made it at least doubtful whether it be in the power of Spain to subdue it, it seems unquestionable that no such civil organization exists which may be recognized as an independent government capable of performing its international obligations and entitled to be treated as one of the powers of the earth.

A recognition under such circumstances would be inconsistent with the facts, and would compel the power granting it soon to support by force the government to which it had really given its only claim of existence. In my judgment, the United States should adhere to the policy and the principles which have heretofore been its sure and safe guides in like contests between revolted colonies and their mother country, and, acting only upon the clearest evidence, should avoid any possibility of suspicion or of imputation.

Belligerence, too, is a fact. The mere existence of contending armed bodies and their occasional conflicts do not constitute war in the sense referred to. Applying to the existing condition of affairs in Cuba the tests recognized by publicists and writers on international law, and which have been observed by nations of dignity, honesty, and power, when free from sensitive or selfish and unworthy motives, I fail to find in the insurrection the existence of such a substantial political organization, real, palpable, and manifest to the



world, having the forms and capable of the ordinary functions of government toward its own people and to other states, with courts for the administration of justice, with a local habitation, possessing such organization of force, such material, such occupation of territory, as to take the contest out of the category of a mere rebellious insurrection or occasional skirmishes and place it on the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would aim to elevate it.

The contest, moreover, is solely on land. The insurrection has not possessed itself of a single seaport whence it may send forth its flag, nor has it any means of communication with foreign powers except through the military lines of its adversaries. No apprehension of any of those sudden and difficult complications which a war upon the ocean is apt to precipitate upon the vessels, both commercial and national, and upon the consular officers of other powers, calls for the definition of their relations to the parties to the contest. Considered as a question of expediency, I regard the accordance of belligerent rights still to be as unwise and premature, as I regard it to be at present indefensible as a measure of right.

As I have said, I was a member of the House when this message was sent to Congress. There was great excitement. We were not in the presence of war then, but there was intense interest, and all the innuendoes, insinuations, and hints of sinister influences were afloat in the air, as now. Cuban sympathizers went so far as to declare that General Grant had lost his courage, that he was under the influence of New York, that the business men of the country had too much to do with the Administration, that he was ruled by his Secretary of State, etc.—something like the charges now made against the President and those who sustain him. But in the case of General Grant what has come to pass? The proudest monument ever raised to perpetuate the memory of any American stands over the grave of this great general, able and pure President; and all the people love and cherish his memory more and more as the years go by, while his calumniators and vilifiers have passed into merited oblivion. The present case is nearly parallel, and I know that William McKinley will survive the attacks made upon him and the mad passion that pursues him, as General Grant survived those made upon him. The President can afford to wait. Time and posterity will vindicate his course and policy on the Cuban question.

There is no clear or certain rule laid down in international law that authorizes the recognition of Cuban independence. I know what Hall, quoted by the distinguished Senator from Ohio [Mr. FORAKER] says, but the Cuban insurgents do not even come within this rule.



Lawrence, in his *Principles of International Law*, page 87, states:

The community thus recognized must, of course, possess a fixed territory within which an organized government rules in civilized fashion, commanding the obedience of its citizens and speaking with authority on their behalf in its dealings with other states. The act of recognition is a normal act, quite compatible with the maintenance of peaceful intercourse with the mother country, if it is not performed till the contest is either actually or virtually over in favor of the new community.

Woolsey, in his last edition on *International Law*, states, page 41:

It is almost needless to say that this rule can not have its application as long as there is evident doubt whether a government is a fact. If the question is still one of armed strife, as between a colony and a mother country, or between a state and a revolted portion of it, to take the part of the colony or of the revolted territory by recognition is an injury and may be a ground of war; but every nation must decide for itself whether an independent state be really established, and needs not to wait until the party opposing the revolutionary effort has accepted the new order of things. It is a safe rule in contests involving the violent separation of a state into parts that when the mother country, in the case of a colony, or the leading portion of a state, in the case of disruption, gives up active efforts to restore the old order of things by war other states may regard the revolution as perfected and a new state as having come into the world.

Hall's *International Law*, page 38, reads as follows:

When a sovereign State, from exhaustion or any other cause, has virtually and substantially abandoned the struggle for supremacy, it has no right to complain if a foreign State treat the independence of its former subjects as *de facto* established. When, on the other hand, the contest is not absolutely or permanently decided, a recognition of the inchoate independence of the insurgents by a foreign State is a hostile act towards the sovereign State, which the latter is entitled to resent as a breach of neutrality and friendship. It is to the facts of the case that foreign nations must look. The question with them ought to be, Is there a *bona fide* contest going on? If it has virtually ceased, the recognition of the insurgents is then at their discretion. It was upon this principle that England and the other powers acted in recognizing the independence of the South American Republics.

The action of some of the European powers toward Greece in 1827, and Belgium in 1830, was not a simple recognition of independence and does not come within the preceding rule. In both cases the powers intervened to settle the disputes, and without this assistance the insurgents would not have succeeded. In the case of Greece, the intervention was based on the ground of humanity and for the suppression of piracy and anarchy. In that of Belgium, the Powers, by their own act at the treaty of Vienna, had united that country to Holland; but finding the union incompatible, they intervened to dissolve it.

These citations from standard authorities lay down the rule on the subject of recognizing the independence of a state, and according to them the Cuban insurgents have no just and valid claims to be recognized.

I agree that the war, with its cruel inhumanities, especially starvation in the Island of Cuba, should stop, and that now is the



time to settle the Cuban problem once and for all. President McKinley says they must be stopped, and now. The question arises, however, as to the best way to accomplish this. I have always said by peace, if possible, but by war if necessary. Is the recognition of Cuban independence, and going to war to make this independence a fact, the best way to relieve the horrors of the war and starvation on the island of Cuba? Would war between Spain and the United States be the best means of relieving these starving people? War between the United States and Spain would, I fear, result in the continued starvation and death of the reconcentrados, numbering, it is said, 150,000, because in the event of war Spain could not relieve them. It has not the means at hand; and the United States, I fear, would not be able to do so. Before relief could reach these people the United States would have to take Cuba and then see that food and supplies reach them in ships guarded by our Navy. All this will take time; and according to the best estimates, these people can not live unless means are provided within ten days to relieve them of starvation.

If we have to go to war with Spain let us not put it on the ground of recognizing the independence of Cuba and fighting to make it a fact, but on the ground of our actual differences with Spain, growing out of our relations during the past thirty years with Cuba, the misgovernment of the island, or the want of government, the loss of property of American citizens, the burden of preserving neutrality between Spain and Cuba during the years that they have been at war, the starvation on the island, inability of Spain for a long number of years to insure protection to life and property, culminating in the *Maine* disaster; and after she refuses to comply with our demand to quit the island and surrender her sovereignty, then declare war explicitly on these grounds.

It is clear that Cuba, according to the rules that govern such cases, has not won her independence, and the recognition of independence would not only be setting a dangerous precedent, but it would weaken our case at home and before the world. But this is not all. The recognition of the independence of Cuba would prevent at the conclusion of the war the United States taking and holding it in part payment of the expenses of the war. While



time to settle the Cuban problem once and for all. President McKinley says they must be stopped, and now. The question arises, however, as to the best way to accomplish this. I have always said by peace, if possible, but by war if necessary. Is the recognition of Cuban independence, and going to war to make this independence a fact, the best way to relieve the horrors of the war and starvation on the island of Cuba? Would war between Spain and the United States be the best means of relieving these starving people? War between the United States and Spain would, I fear, result in the continued starvation and death of the reconcentrados, numbering, it is said, 150,000, because in the event of war Spain could not relieve them. It has not the means at hand; and the United States, I fear, would not be able to do so. Before relief could reach these people the United States would have to take Cuba and then see that food and supplies reach them in ships guarded by our Navy. All this will take time; and according to the best estimates, these people can not live unless means are provided within ten days to relieve them of starvation.

If we have to go to war with Spain let us not put it on the ground of recognizing the independence of Cuba and fighting to make it a fact, but on the ground of our actual differences with Spain, growing out of our relations during the past thirty years with Cuba, the misgovernment of the island, or the want of government, the loss of property of American citizens, the burden of preserving neutrality between Spain and Cuba during the years that they have been at war, the starvation on the island, inability of Spain for a long number of years to insure protection to life and property, culminating in the *Maine* disaster; and after she refuses to comply with our demand to quit the island and surrender her sovereignty, then declare war explicitly on these grounds.

It is clear that Cuba, according to the rules that govern such cases, has not won her independence, and the recognition of independence would not only be setting a dangerous precedent, but it would weaken our case at home and before the world. But this is not all. The recognition of the independence of Cuba would prevent at the conclusion of the war the United States taking and holding it in part payment of the expenses of the war. While



I have always opposed annexation, yet in the event of the United States going to war it will not only take Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, but all the territory of Spain in the Western Hemisphere; and, having taken this territory in war, we should hold it as a war indemnity and dispose of it as we please, because Spain is a bankrupt nation and this is the only way we can get indemnity.

If we recognize the independence of the insurgents, that they have established a government on the island and have one at the close of the war, what will be the situation? The United States will have driven Spain from Cuba, and then Cuba can invite the United States to leave the island in the hands and control of the government the United States has recognized. It will claim it is an independent nation among the nations of the earth, and the United States could take no part in making a stable government, preserving peace or exercising any jurisdiction on the island. Recognizing the independence of Cuba would not help us in war against Spain.

I am clearly of opinion that if we have to go to war with Spain we should do so on grounds other than to secure the independence of Cuba. If we recognize the independence of Cuba and go to war to make it a fact, then we will have no claim on the Cuban Government to pay part of the expenses of the war. If we give Cuba to the insurgents now, as proposed, by recognizing independence, then at the conclusion of the war we will have no claim on the island or the insurgents to pay part of our war debt; whereas if we delay recognition we can decide, with all the facts before us, what is better to do and what best suits our interests. To my mind this is the safest and wisest course to pursue. If Cuba comes to us as the result of war on grounds I have stated, then all the debts and bonds of Spain secured by the revenues of Cuba will be extinguished and no obligations will rest upon the United States in case she takes Cuba or the insurgents in case of independence, except those the Cuban Government may wish to recognize.

Mr. President, in this debate the glories and advantages of war have been commended as being in the interest and to the advantage of nations. While not opposing war with Spain, I must say



this is new and strange talk in the Senate of the United States in the closing decade of the nineteenth century. We have been taught for hundreds of years that war is a calamity at best. It brings with it devastation, destruction, want, woe, and tears. It brings mourning and sorrow into once happy homes, and leaves in its wake widows and orphans. It increases the pension list, the national debt, and taxation. Go ask the South if war is a good thing; ask Greece; ask the Armenians. Ask the victors and vanquished in every war. Read of the desolation and want that followed the Thirty Years' war, the Seven Years' war, and the Napoleonic wars. Poetry and painting have been invoked in all ages to portray the horrors, desolation, and destruction of war.

I admired the speech of the Senator from Nebraska [Mr. THURSTON]. I was held spellbound at his apostrophe to force and blood; but let me say to the distinguished Senator and orator who stirred the country so deeply by his splendid effort that the "Still, small voice" has wrought more toward helping humanity than all the force and all the wars of the world.

War strikes down dynasties, changes sovereignty and boundaries of states, but thought and high ideas move peoples and influence the world. War points toward barbarism and savagery; peace to progress and a better civilization. Emerson says:

The soul of God is poured into the world through the thoughts of men. The world stands on ideas, and the source of all elements is moral force.

The United States has for twenty-five years, from Grant to McKinley, arraigned Spain for the cruelties, misdoings, and horrors which she has permitted and committed on the Island of Cuba. But no President until the present Chief Executive has said definitely and positively that war and these cruelties should cease, peace reign, and good government be established on the Island of Cuba. During this period our Presidents have declared that there might arise an occasion when the United States should intervene to bring war to an end; but for the first time in thirty years of the agitation of the Cuban question the present Chief Executive has declared formally in a message that this war must stop.

Mr. President, he not only declares "this war must stop," but he says, "I want Congress to authorize me to use the Army



and the Navy to stop it." This is reasonable. Why not comply with his request? Is it unfair? Is it unjust? Is it wrong? What more could he do? Let him send this ultimatum to Spain coupled with an expression of the feeling of the American people about the *Maine* disaster. Then, if it is refused, let Congress declare war. That would be the orderly, dignified way to proceed.

Now, Mr. President, what is the position of the President in these times of trouble that have fallen upon him? With the destinies and honor of the great Republic in his keeping in this trying ordeal he has borne himself with great poise. This burden has rested upon him for months, and he has spoken. After assembling all the facts, he has reached a conclusion and embodied it in his message. I sustain his position with all my heart. In his message, on page 10, he says:

Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be wise or prudent for this Government to recognize, at the present time, the independence of the so-called Cuban Republic. Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation toward the organization so recognized.

On page 13, he further declares:

The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged the war can not be attained. The fire of insurrection may flame or may smolder with varying seasons, but it has not been and it is plain that it can not be extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.

In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

His position, in brief, is that the war must stop in the Island of Cuba and a government set up stable in form, one that can perform its international obligations. This means an independent government. It means a free government. It means a republican government, and that means the freedom of Cuba. If we had trusted the President, in my judgment, he would have accomplished all these things through peace, with honor to the country,



and averted war. I think we should have left the case in his hands, and if we had done so Cuba would have secured her independence in due season and without war.

On so momentous a question we should go to the world united, not divided in Congress and opposed to the President. We can not afford to be divided. On the House resolution, for which I will vote, we would have a united Congress, all parties and the President together. What has the President done to forfeit our confidence? Why should he be attacked in the press and on this floor? In this, however, he is only suffering what has fallen to the lot of the most illustrious names in our history. Washington was attacked, Lincoln was attacked, Grant was abused, and McKinley can not hope to escape. Lincoln's emancipation proclamation was asked and demanded for two years, but it did not come a day too early nor a day too late. If we had left this case in the hands of the President, in my opinion Cuba would have gotten her independence without war and not one day too late.

I have not time to reply to the speech of the distinguished Senator from Ohio, but it shows what a warm heart and heated imagination will do when fired by impassioned zeal in a cause that has him for an advocate. He has given the insurgents a government as good as any in the world, and hardly surpassed by Moore's Utopia. His legal proposition that war and change of sovereignty on the island would not extinguish all Spanish bonds, whether secured by the revenues of Cuba or not, is indefensible. All bonds and obligations would be burnt out in the hot flame of war. If the United States should take Cuba by war no Spanish collector would ever supervise the collection of revenues on the island, and all claims by Spain for the payment of such bonds would be resisted.

When the Senator's speech was being delivered a friend remarked, "That speech will make him President." I said, "Not now; we need him in the Senate." But what becomes of the claims of other members of the Committee on Foreign Relations? What becomes of the claims of my conservative, thoughtful, and judicial-minded friend from Illinois [Mr. MASON]? He has led the fight for Cuba and urged war from the beginning. But let me remind Senators, as I read history, the heroes of wars are made in the field and not in the Senate. I have no idea that a thought of the Presi-



dency was in the mind of the Senator from Ohio when opposing the policy of the President.

Now, Mr. President, one word about the freedom of Cuba. I have always desired the independence of the Cuban people. I so declared in the Senate two years ago, and I have believed that in the end they would obtain it, but I have opposed the United States going to war solely to establish this independence. Better a bold declaration of war on account of the *Maine* disaster and other differences with Spain than the entangling resolutions before the Senate. The *Maine* and thirty years of misrule on the Island of Cuba furnish a better case. It is the destruction of the *Maine*, not yet properly explained, that stirs the American people.

Under the resolutions difficult questions are raised as to what debts will be assumed in case of war, what are the actual conditions on the Island of Cuba, and many others. But above and beyond all this the resolutions commit us to recognizing the independence of Cuba at this time. Contrary to all precedent and the American doctrine, they make Congress declare that Cuba is free and independent when it is not true and all admit it is not. They go further and make Congress usurp the legislative functions and prerogatives of the Chief Executive in the matter of recognition of independence—a violation of the Constitution which we are sworn to obey. Better war, yes, many wars, than this, because when the violation of the Constitution begins the end of the Republic is near at hand.

Now, that we are about to have war, I am willing that the Senators from Ohio, Illinois, and Minnesota and other States may have the credit and responsibility of the agitation of the Cuban question against the President's plan, but from the moment war is declared it becomes the war of the American people, under the American flag, and I favor making it swift, decisive, and destructive, taking Cuba, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines, then on to Cadiz and Barcelona with our squadrons, and on our banners inscribed the legend, "Remember the *Maine*." I desire the war to be a memorable and lasting example to the world of the power of the Great Republic on sea and land.

Mr. President, the message of the President may be disregarded and ignored by Congress, but it will go down the centuries as a



living force, making for justice and right conduct in our relations with other governments. It will stand as the flower and fruit of the highest and broadest statesmanship, and be a mighty influence in directing future peoples and nations toward the haven of peace with honor as well as the making of war in the interest of humanity and liberty. President McKinley's place in history is made; it is secure beyond the reach of calumny. He may be abused and misrepresented in the press and on the floor of the Senate. But this can not take from him the affection, loyalty, and confidence of his countrymen. He will be remembered as a great American statesman and President. His name is enrolled among the list of those the country can not forget.

Mr. President, this is a time of serious concern—a supreme moment in the life and affairs of this nation. We are making history rapidly, but are we making it wisely? We are in danger not from foreign foes. These we can conquer. We are in danger from ourselves, from passion, from teaching a lesson, establishing a precedent, that may be used some day against us, and doing an act that will not have the approval of the national conscience nor the sanction of the civilized world. The great Republic can not afford to make such a record. Conscious of our strength, we should be patient, temperate, just, and fair in all our dealings with the peoples and governments of the world. Varying the words of the rising poet, we should say, in the trials through which we are now passing:

God of our fathers, guide us yet,  
Lest we forget—lest we forget.



